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Changes in the multilateral trade dispute settlement (DS) system were heralded as a 
major achievement of the Uruguay Round. Certainly, tighter time-lines and more binding 
decisions have increased developing countries' use of the WTO's new DS system. At the 
same time, many countries have access to regional mechanisms for handling 
disagreements with other members of regional trade agreements and customs unions. 
This paper reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the new WTO DS system and 
compares it with the regional mechanisms created under the NAFTA, MERCOSUR and 
the Andean Community. Finally, it evaluates the options for DS within an eventual Free 
Trade Agreement of the Americas. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. 
For instance, Schott and Buurman 
(1994:172) give the OS agreement an 
'A' grade. 
An effective and efficient DS mechanism is generally recognized as fundamental to the 
international trading system. While trade negotiators may seek to achieve clear and fair rules 
with a broad degree of consensus and commitment, a DS system is needed to ensure 
commitments are honored. Eventually, DS mechanisms could compensate for areas of 
ambiguity in the rules. 
In the early days of the GATT many differences were addressed through bilateral 
consultations. Over the years, however, this proved inadequate. In the 1970s and 1980s an 
increasing number of cases were brought before GATT panels, but with delays, different 
procedures for different issues, and particularly the ability of the defending country to block 
the panel findings, complainants lost heart in the system, and many countries did not even 
bother to contest cases. 
It was therefore critical in the Uruguay Round that negotiators were assured that the time 
invested in developing new rules in several areas would not be wasted by a weak DS system 
-- the new rules needed to be more clearly enforceable. Other institutional and procedural 
changes, including the regular monitoring of member countries' trade policies and practices, 
were also important. But most observers have focussed on the WTO's new DS rules as being 
a major achievement of the Uruguay Round1. For smaller economies, which had made little 
use of the GATT DS system, the changes seemed particularly significant, although there were 
some concerns e.g. about the possibility of retaliation. One of the questions to be addressed 
in this paper is how far has the new DS system lived up to expectations, and especially to 
the expectations of the countries of the Americas. 
Since the late l9SOs, even while the Uruguay Round negotiations were underway, several 
regional trading arrangements were signed, such as CUSFTA in 1988, MERCOSUR in 1991 
and NAFTA in 1992 and other revitalized such as the Andean Pact in 1987. Each of these 
has its own system for dealing with disputes. In fact, for Canada, a prime oblective in the 
CUSFTA, once it was realized that the US would not agree to eliminating countervailing and 
anti-dumping duties within the FTA, was to secure a way to resolve disputes involving these 
duties that was speedier and more effective than in the GATT. 
With the proliferation of regional mechanisms, another question is what are their relative 
strengths and weaknesses in relation to the WTO and what implications does experience with 
their use have for an eventual FTAA. If there is to be free trade within the hemisphere, what 
would be the most appropriate approach to DS? 
The first section of this paper provides the background. It reviews the system as it evolved 
under the GATT, the reasons why radical changes were sought in the Uruguay Round, and 
the preliminary assessments of what was accomplished in the Round, i.e. the strengths and 
weaknesses of the WTO DS system before it began work. In doing so it notes key differences 
between countries' positions and particularly the extent to which the countries of the 
Americas worked together on these issues. 
n the second section we turn to the regional DS mechanisms which now exist within the 
Western Hemisphere, focussing on NAFTA, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. After 
briefly describing their key elements, we review major similarities and differences between 
the DS mechanisms at the regional and multilateral levels. 
Experience with the multilateral DS system and different regional mechanisms s reviewed ¡n 
the third section. Here we analyze, in fairly aggregated terms, the numbers and kinds of 
disputes being brought for resolution by different categories of countries. 
The final section review some of the strengths and weaknesses that have become apparent 
with the experience, and a number of proposals for change that are already on the table. It 
considers conclusions for changes in the WTO and existing regional DS systems, and 
possible directions for a hemispheric trade agreement, particularly from the perspective of 
Latin American countries. It also raises some broader questions about the costs and benefits 
of the WTO DS system, including the extent to which ¡t strengthens or weakens regional 
integration efforts. 
2. 
Uruguay identified more than 500 
such measures that restncted its 
access to these markets. 
SECTION I 
EVOLUTION OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE GATT/WTO 
A. THE GATF RULES. THEIR EVOLUTION AND NEGOTIATION IN THE UR 
When the GATT was negotiated in 1947 was viewed as a temporary agreement, eventually 
to be subsumed by the International Trade Organization (ITO). Under the Havana Charter, 
the ITO would have allowed a ruling by the 18-member Executive Board to be upheld, 
modified or rejected by a majority of the full membership (Arts. 75, 94 and 95), with final 
recourse to the International Court of Justice for a binding advisory opinion (Stewart 
1993:2672 and Havana 
Charter). Although initially Few cases were brought before panels in the 
similar references to first 25 years. In the 1950s there were some 
binding arbitration by the 
International Court were 40 complaints and only 10 in the 1960s, and 
included in the draft of the fewer panels. 
GATT, these were later 
dropped. The two principal Articles (XXII and XXIII) focussed on consultations and failing 
this approach the matter would be referred to the full membership (technically the 
contracting parties) for their investigation and recommendation. Initially disputes were 
referred to a working party, but from the early 1950s they were referred to a panel of experts 
(Stewart 1993:2676). 
A number of other modifications in practice or actual amendments to the rules were 
adopted in subsequent years, several at the request of developing countries. 
Firstly, from 1958, third parties were allowed to participate in disputes -- i.e. countries with 
a significant interest in a case. Second, in 1966 special procedures were introduced for 
developing countries following discussions within the Committee on Trade and 
Development. These provided for the GATT Director-General to become involved in 
developed-developing country cases, and, if necessary, for expedited panel reviews and 
implementation of panel findings. But they did not go as far as Brazil and Uruguay, inter 
alia, had wanted; their joint proposal had included additional compensation for developing 
countries and automatic retaliation against developed countries whose trade practices 
violated the GATT (Stewart 1993:2678-9). Their concern about the need for the DS 
mechanism to directly address the unequal bargaining power of big and small economies 
was reflected in many subsequent proposals for reform. 
Few cases were brought before panels in the first 25 years. In the 1950s there were some 
40 complaints and only 10 in the 1960s, and fewer panels. Not once during this period 
did Canada use the consultation or DS provisions for any trade problems with the US. 
Hart (1998:111) argues that Canada preferred to solve problems bilaterally, using its 
special relationship' outside the GATT. Others, however, have interpreted this low usage 
of the GATT procedures as a weakness of the system, with many deterred by the failure 
of cases brought early in the 1960s to be resolved (notably the repeated retaliation 
involved in the EU-US chicken wars) (Stewart 1993:2680). In the 1960s Uruguay 
brought a number of complaints, 'a broad-scale attack' according to Dam (1970:361), 
challenging several developed countries' policies that had injured Uruguayan exports, 
even if they did not violate specific GATT rules2. The panel suggested the matters should 
be addressed instead by consultations (under Article XXII) 'thereby effectively deciding 
against Uruguay' (Dam 1970:362). 
Beginning in the 1970s there was a proliferation in the number of countries using the GATT 
OS. The first case Canada brought on its own was in 1974 and concerned compensation 
for EU enlargement. Nonetheless there were frustrations as many smaller exporting 
countries were forced by larger importing countries to accept 'voluntary' restraint 
agreements or other grey-area measures, which were difficult to contest in the GATT. Many 
non-tariff measures were not covered by GATT rules, or else, as in the case of the restraints 
under the Multifibre Arrangement, were explicitly allowed. 
During the Tokyo Round of negotiations (1973-79), Brazil played an active role in the 
Framework Group which, amongst other topics, discussed new rules for dealing with 
disputes. It sought rules which would redress the imbalance between developed and 
developing countries, notably greater involvement of the Director-General in such cases, 
mandatory prior notification of measures that would affect developing countries, and 
improved surveillance. The US supported an annual trade review of members' policies, 
tighter timelines for cases, a roster of governmental experts for consideration as panelists, 
although t opposed making notification mandatory. There were greater differences with the 
EU and Japan which considered it inappropriate to negotiate DS separately outside the 
other negotiating groups, and the EU opposed differential DS rules procedures for 
developing countries (Stewart 1993:2691). 
In the end, the Tokyo Round produced both a new understanding on general DS cases as 
well as a variety of special rules under the various plurilateral codes. The understanding 
clarified in particular the work, procedures and composition of the panels. Panels were to 
include three to five members from governments not involved in the dispute; their reports 
were to be completed within two months for developing countries, but nine months for 
others. Their reports would be circulated first to the countries in the dispute and after a 
'reasonable period' to all other members, and if approved, the offending measures were to 
be withdrawn within a 'reasonable time'. Examples of how the code rules differed from the 
more general rules were: requiring a minimum amount of consultations before proceeding 
to a committee review (subsidies), the use of a technical panel (customs valuation), quicker 
procedures for perishable products (standards). These special provisions were not available 
to countries that had not signed onto the codes, mostly developing countries. 
Subsequently, in the 1980s, the number of disputes taken to the GATT rose sharply. This 
reflected the growth in protectionism, especially in the US and its insistence on taking 
unilateral action in areas over which the GATT had no jurisdiction (such as services). 
Countries like Canada which in the past had sought to deal with issues bilaterally, outside 
the GATT, now found it 
necessary to go for litigation In the 1980s, the number of disputes taken to 
in order to have disputes the GATT rose sharply. This reflected the growth 
resolved (Hart 1998:163). A 
large number of cases were in protectionism, especially in the US and its 
successfully resolved (19 of insistence on taking unilateral action in areas 
the 29 panels created from 
1979 to 1986 produced over which the GATT had no jurisdiction. 
reports which were adopted 
-- Stewart 1993:2733) suggesting that the GATT system could work to discipline trade, even 
in cases involving the US and the EU. Certainly one close observer argued that the increase 
in the number of cases was a sign of renewed confidence in the GATT, noting that, 'There 
is no other international organization ... with such a large number and successful record of 
multilateral DS proceedings among states' (Petersmann 1988:61). Nonetheless there was 
general agreement about the need and scope for improvement in the DS process, in 
particular to give more precision to the rules. In addition, changes in the GATT's substantive 
rules were clearly needed. 
Repeatedly in the 1980s -- at the 1982 Ministerial Meeting, at Council Meetings in 1983 
and 1984, in the Leutwiler Report of 1985 and in the 1986 Preparatory Committee -- 
several proposals were submitted (including some from Canada and Nicaragua) on ways to 
go beyond the Tokyo Round and strengthen the DS system -- such as creating a shortlist 
of panelists, encouraging the use of conciliation, tighter timelines for submitting documents 
to panels, surveillance or enforcement of compliance with panel rulings, and penalties for 
non-compliance. 
3. 
The Chair of the institutional working 
group was Ambassador Lacarte-Muró 
from Uruguay. 
When the Uruguay Round was launched in 1986, DS formed one of the 13 (later 15) topics 
for negotiation, with the aim of strengthening the rules and procedures and improving 
surveillance to ensure compliance: 
'In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of 
all contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the rules 
and the procedures of the DS process, while recognizing the contribution that 
would be made by more effective and enforceable GATT rules and disciplines. 
Negotiations shall include the development of adequate arrangements for 
overseeing and monitoring of the procedures that would facilitate compliance 
with adopted recommendations." (GATT Ministerial Declaration 1986) 
The need for reform had widespread support and although there were differences in overall 
approach and in a few areas of detail, changes to the DS procedures and increased 
surveillance of members' policies were amongst the 'early harvest' results of the Round, 
agreed in Montreal in December 1988 and implemented in May 1989. (The only other areas 
with some early results were tropical products, overall tariff cuts, and trade in services.) 
The US favoured changes which would make panels virtually automatic and more legalistic 
(in particular through greater use of non-governmental experts) and also ensure that their 
findings were precedential. Hart (1998:164) notes that there had already been a shift to a 
more litigious approach in handling disputes, involving the presentation to panels of more 
legal arguments and an increase in the length of panel reports: "Before 1980, both GATT 
and national trade officials had strenuously, and proudly, resisted inroads by officials with 
legal training onto their turf. In the 1980s, the GATT established a legal division, and 
national officials learned to rely on their legal colleagues for advice in leading them through 
the new minefield of GATT-based litigation." 
In contrast, both the EU and Japan sought changes to increase use of the consultation, 
conciliation and mediation aspects of the DS system. 
Within the Americas, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Jamaica, Mexico and Nicaragua were also 
quite active in the negotiations. Both Nicaragua and Brazil pressed for various measures to 
strengthen the special and differential treatment of developing countries. Jamaica 
advocated third parties be able to participate in cases involving grey areas. Argentina 
proposed banning disputants from the approval of the panel report. Mexico played a key 
role -- following informal consultations it drafted a comprehensive proposal which it hoped 
would be the basis of a consensus. At the same time a unanimous proposal was submitted 
by the De la Paix group (named after the hotel in Geneva where they first met) -- a 13- 
country coalition, which included Canada, Colombia, and Uruguay from the Americas.3 
This group, which sought to bridge the differences between the developing country 
hardliners and the major powers, prepared a number of proposals on different issues 
during the negotiations. Its submission on DS included a tighter timetable for different 
stages of the process, using the director-general to resolve differences in panel selection, 
removing disputing countries' right to block any findings and introducing binding arbitration 
(Finlayson and Weston, 1990:32, 34). 
As a result of these efforts, several changes were accepted and implemented in 1989 on a 
trial basis. These included: 
Specific time-lines for various stages of the dispute process with a total timelimit of 15 
months from the initiation of consultations. 
Special (shorter) timelimits for cases involving perishable products. 
Longer time limits for some aspects of cases involving developing countries. 
Arbitration as an alternative to panels, especially in cases involving clearly defined issues. 
An expanded list of non-governmental experts for use on panels. 
lo 
Legal advice for developing countries involved in a dispute. 
Implementation of panel findings to be reviewed within six months. 
In addition to strengthen the functioning of the GATT system, members agreed to introduce 
regular reviews of countries' national trade policies as well as a review of the overall trading 
system, biennial ministerial meetings and closer coordination with the MF and the World 
Bank (GATT 1989:152-163). 
Despite this progress, there were still disagreements on some key aspects of DS, which became 
the focus of the following two years of negotiation4. These included: the procedure for adopting 
a panel report, the timeline for its implementation, compensation and retaliation, unilateral 
measures, rules for 'non-violation' cases, and special treatment for developing countries. 
Several proposals were advanced for dealing with panel reports. Most had still involved 
requiring a consensus for its adoption, though some excluded the disputants from the 
process. In 1989, the suggestions of a review stage (before presenting the report to the 
Council) and an appellate body generated new movement. Despite the additional time 
required for the review, estimated at about three months, it was generally accepted. Canada 
argued that once such a 
review was over, unless the Few of the suggestions for differential treatment 
findings were appealed, the of cases involving developing countries found 
report should be auto- 
matically accepted. The US widespread support. 
proposed automatic adop- 
tion of a panel report unless it went to an appellate body, which would, in extraordinary 
circumstances, focus on narrow legal questions. Mexico suggested that any ruling by such 
a body should be binding. The idea was also endorsed by Canada, though others were 
concerned about the delay involved and the likelihood that this would become the rule 
rather than the exception. It was not until 1990 that the suggestion was made for panel 
reports to be considered adopted unless there was a consensus not to do so or one of the 
disputants appealed the findings. 
Compliance with panel rulings was left undefined, i.e. it was to be 'prompt' although 'if it is 
impracticable to comply immediately .. the contracting party shall have a reasonable period 
of time in which to do so' (GATT 1989:158). In subsequent discussions Mexico proposed 
a two-year time limit (Stewart 1993:2767). Others argued that if an appeal found the 
defendant guilty then retaliation should be allowed automatically. 
Another key development was the idea of a single or integrated OS system, raised by 
Canada in 1990, to govern disputes in all areas. This was linked to countries accepting all 
the GATT trade rules in a single undertaking and allowing cross-retaliation. 
With respect to third party rights in dispute proceedings, an issue of potential interest to 
many smaller countries, questions focussed on the nature and extent of their involvement 
including whether they should have the same rights as the original respondents. 
On cases involving non-violation, i.e. where trade is affected even if no GATT rules are 
broken, and which accounted for 1 in 10 cases addressed from 1948 to 1988 (GATT 
1990:68), some countries argued for the same rights to OS. Others argued that the burden 
of proof should lie with the complainant, whereas in all other cases it lies with the 
defendant, and that cross-retaliation might be more appropriate. Another proposal was for 
the use of binding arbitration rather than full blown OS procedures. 
Few of the suggestions for differential treatment of cases involving developing countries 
found widespread support. These ranged from having mediators considering developing 
countries' developmental needs, and having a review of bilateral solutions (e.g. resulting 
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4. 
Although the negotiations as a whole 
continued until late in 1993, the 
bulk of the work on OS was finished 
and included in the draft final agree. 
ment produced in late 1991 (see 
GATT 1992). 
from consultations) to ensure they meet the principle of special and differential treatment, 
to compensation rather than retaliation if the non-complying country is developing, and 
compensation in excess of injury where it is the affected country. Special treatment for 
least-developed countries was also raised, including the creation of a separate conciliation 
body for disputes involving them (GATT 1990:68). 
B. THE WTO UNDERSTANDING ON NORMS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
The final agreement on DS produced the following key results, in addition to endorsing 
those changes agreed in Montreal: 
Establishment of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
Automatic right to a panel unless rejected by consensus (Article 6.1). 
An opportunity for the disputants to review the panel's interim report -- if there are no 
comments this becomes the final report (Article 15). 
All panel reports, unless appealed by the disputants, would be adopted unless opposed 
by a consensus (Article 16). 
The creation of a standing appellate review body with seven members having expertise in 
law, international trade and GATT, broadly representative of the membership but not 
attached to any government, of whom 3 would sit on any single case. The appellate report 
would be issued in 60 days (or 90 days if necessary) and adopted in 30 days unless 
Opposed by a consensus (Article 17). 
Panel reports are to be passed by the DSB within nine months from the formation of the 
panel, and appellate reports within 12 months from the same date (Article 20). 
Implementation of panel/appellate findings may be decided by binding arbitration and shall 
usually be within 15 months from their adoption. Should there be disagreement over the 
measures implemented, they shall be assessed by the original panel within 90 days (Article 21). 
If policy changes are not implemented and compensation not agreed, the complaining 
country may suspend equivalent concessions. In the first instance these should be in the 
disputed sector, but if not practicable or effective, they may be in other sectors under the 
same agreement. If 'the circumstances are serious enough' the suspended concessions 
may relate to another agreement. The suspensions will be approved by the DSB unless 
there is a consensus against them. If the affected country objects, the matter will be sent 
for arbitration by the original panel or by an arbitrator within 60 days, during which time 
concessions may not be suspended (Article 22). 
Countries agree to take any disputes relating to the agreements first to the WTO for 
resolution (Article 23). 
Other elements of note were: 
Automatic right of a third party to make submissions and to see the disputants' submissions to 
the panel at its first meeting (but its rights would have to be pursued in a separate panel) (Art. 10). 
The possibility for panels to seek expert advice; for factual issues relating to scientific or 
technical issues, an advisory report may be requested from a group of experts which will 
exclude experts from the governments involved in the dispute and even non-governmental 
experts unless agreed by both parties (Article 13 and Appendix 4). 
Both panel deliberations and appellate proceedings are to be confidential and the opinions 
anonymous (Articles 14, 17:10-11). 
In cases of non-violation but involving nullification and impairment, countries must justify their 
complaints -- they will be the subject of a panel report, but the findings will not be binding, and 
they will usually focus on compensation rather than the removal of the measures (Article 26). 
There were few specific references to developing countries, besides the following: 
A developing country may choose to follow the 1966 provisions (Article 3.12). 
12 
During consultations the particular problems and interests of developing countries shall 
be given special attention (Article 4.10). 
In a case involving a developing and a developed country the former may request that at 
least one panel member be from a developing country (Article 8.10). 
The panel shall make explicit reference to how its report takes into account whatever 
differential and more favourable treatment for developing countries is included in the 
GATT/WTO provisions involved in the dispute (Article 12.11). 
In implementation of any measures following a panel ruling, particular attention should 
be given to developing country interests (Article 21.2). 
For disputes over the follow-up to panel findings where the complainant is a developing 
country, there shall be consideration of the economic as well as the trade impact of the 
measures in question (Article 21.7-8). 
In any case involving least-developed countries, others are expected to exercise due 
restraint' -- whether raising matters or asking for compensation/suspension of concessions. 
In addition they will be given assistance e.g. from the director-general in resolving 
disagreements persisting after consultations, by conciliation or mediation rather than 
through a panel (Article 24). 
C. INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE WTO DS SYSTEM 
Initial reactions to the Uruguay Round outcomes were generally favourable. Amongst the 
more critical points made were: 
The penalties remained weak (Whalley and Hamilton 1996). Although big countries like 
the US would not want to undermine credibility in the trading system by setting a bad 
example, it was not clear that the new rules would make them any more likely to comply with 
panel findings than in the past. Even if retaliation was more likely to be sanctioned, few 
countries would pose a credible threat. 'The WTO can reprimand but not severely punish 
violations by major trading powers' (Schott and Buurman 1994:130). Instead one suggestion 
was that the WTO ought to consider penalties against frequent violators i.e. withdraw its own 
license to retaliate if it failed to implement three panel reports in five years (ibid). 
The US would still be able to use section 301 (of the 1974 Trade Act) to initiate WTO 
cases, to implement 
retaliation first approved by Not only are the special and differential provi- 
the WTO, and for pursuing sions limited in number, they are also much less 
complaints in areas not 
covered by the WTO law. effective than are the substantive rules to which 
Questions about the developing countries subscribed in the Round. 
capacity of the DSB to 
handle the large volume of If any of the S&D provisions is not applied, the 
complaints expected to matter is unlikely to be pursued through the 
result from the ambiguities 
and loopholes in the WTO DS system. 
substantive rules. 
Not only are the special and differential provisions limited in number, they are also much 
less effective than are the substantive rules to which developing countries subscribed in the 
Round. If any of the S&D provisions is not apphed, the matter is unlikely to be pursued 
through the WTO DS system. 
For several areas (sanitary/phytosanitary measures, textiles/clothing, technical barriers to 
trade, dumping, customs valuation, subsidies/countervail, services) there are additional 
and special dispute provisions (Appendix 2) e.g. textiles and clothing disputes will first be 
taken to the Textiles Monitoring Body (TM B) for review, thereby extending the length of time 
for a dispute to be taken through all available WTO procedures. 
In the case of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, the DSB's powers were 
considerably weakened by limiting it to review the procedure rather than the substance of 
national investigations. 'Consequently, antidumping rules remain subject to discretionary 
13 
interpretation under domestic legislation. This is the greatest gap left by the Uruguay 
Round' (Tussie 199720). 
The applicability of the WTO dispute rules to the plurilateral agreements (dairy, beef, 
government procurement and civil aircraft) was to be determined by members of those 
agreements at a later date (WTO Agreement, Appendix 1). 
s I I P £ 




Source: Schott and Buurman 1994: 127. 
SECTION II 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
We now turn to the regional DS mechanisms which exist within the Western Hemisphere, 
focussing on NAFTA, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. After briefly describing 
their key elements, we review major similarities and differences between the DS 
mechanisms at the regional and multilateral levels. 
A. CUSFTA/NAFTA DS RULES 
A critical reason for Canada to sign the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) with 
the US in the late 1980s was a desire to reduce the possibility of disputes disrupting 
bilateral trade, and if disputes arose, that these would be dealt with effectively and more 
expeditiously than was possible in the GATT at that time. 
Canada's primary interest in the NAFTA, on the other hand, was to ensure that its privileged 
position in the US market was not undermined, though of course improved access to the 
Mexican market subsequently gained some importance. In fact there was some concern that 
the NAFTA might weaken the 05 mechanism, and terminate all efforts to reach an 
understanding on dumping and subsidies that would have eliminated the need for Chapter 19. 
In the NAFTA, there are four different types of dispute resolution processes -- those relating 
to complaints by private investors (under Chapter 11), financial services (Chapter 14), anti- 
dumping/countervail (Chapter 19) and all other matters (Chapter 20). In addition, the so- 
called NAFTA side-agreements on labour and the environment have established 
procedures for dealing with certain trade-related disagreements in these areas. 
If an investor from one of the NAFTA countries claims that another NAFTA government has 
failed to meet its obligations, then the investor may choose to pursue the matter by seeking 
14 
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Request for panel 
Establishment of panel 









Adoption of panel report 60 12-16 
If appealed: 
Decisions of appellate body report 60-90 14-19 
Adoption of appellate body report 30 15-20 
Compliance or compensation reasonable time'; 
usually <15 months 
If failure to comply/compensate: 
Request for retaliation 20 
Authorization of retaliation 30 
Final arbitration 60 
arbitration by the World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) or under UN Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules. 
Alternatively the NAFTA allows the matter to be taken to the host country's domestic courts. 
Either way, the NAFTA countries have agreed to make the arbitration's awards enforceable 
in domestic courts. 
In the case of financial services, a special roster of financial services experts will be used 
in the selection of panelists for resolution of a dispute. 
For dumping and countervailing cases, instead of a company appealing a final 
determination to a domestic court (e.g. in Canada the Federal Court of Appeal or the 
Tribunal Fiscal de la Federación in Mexico), it may request its government to take the case 
to a binational panel review. The panel includes 5 people -- two selected by each country 
and the fifth jointly. Whereas under the CUSFTA these were to be drawn from a roster of 
experts in the area of international trade law and economics, in the NAFTA this was 
changed to a roster of 75 active or retired judges. 
Once a panel has been requested, its final decision is to be reached within 315 days, 
following a strict timeline for the different stages (see Table 2). The panel will review the case 
against national standards rather than any trilateral standards. This means, in the case of the 
US, that the panel will consider whether the International Trade Agency, the Department of 
Commerce or the International Trade Commission determined the dumping/subsidizing 
injury or the duty according to US law and that there was substantial evidence to support the 
facts of the case. In Canada, the standard of review is considered higher, i.e. that the finding 
by Revenue Canada or the Canadian International Trade Tribunal is made with little regard 
to the evidence (Howse 1998:8). If it is found that national standards have not been applied, 
the panel will send the case back to the national authorities to be reconsidered -- it cannot 
order the duty to be removed or reduced (Howse 1998:5). 
In cases of impropriety or gross error including the failure to apply the appropriate standard 
of review, an extraordinary challenge is allowed, in which three judges or former judges from 
a 15-person roster may review the findings. The scope for such a challenge is broader than 
under the CUSFTA which required that a panelist be considered guilty of gross misconduct, 
that the panel had not followed the basic procedures, or that it had exceeded its authority. 
The committee may re-examine virtually the whole case -- the factual and legal analysis of 
the case -- and the time allowed for this was increased from 30 days under the CUSFTA to 
90 days under the NAFTA. Finally, a three person special committee may review allegations 
that another country's laws have interfered with the functioning of the panel system (for 
example, that it has made it difficult for the panel to carry out its review of a final anti- 
dumping duty determination) (NAFTA Secretariat 1998). 
Finally, for other cases, consultations to resolve differences in the first instance are to be 
handled through the various committees created under the agreements (Chapter 20). If 
these fail then the matter may be referred to an arbitral panel for review, whose 
recommendations will normally be expected to be followed (Lipsey 1994:111). The panel 
is composed of five members with experience in law, trade or other relevant matters, and 
selection is usually from a pre-agreed roster of 30 people nominated for renewable three- 
year terms. They are picked by a reverse selection' process i.e. one country picks nationals 
of the other and the chair is a national of the third country. The panel may ask a scientific 
review board to provide assistance in the form of a factual report. The third country may 
join the consultations if it has substantial interests in the matter, or else it may just attend 
hearings and receive others' submissions etc. The final report is due within some 160 days 
of the request for an arbitral panel. 
If members are unable to agree over whether to resolve differences under the GATT/WTO 
or the NAFTA, then the dispute shall be settled under NAFTA (Article 2005). In cases 
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involving environmental agreements, sanitary and phytosanitary measures or standards, 
the defending country may choose to have the matter only considered within the NAFTA. 
In all other cases, once it has been directed to the NAFTA it can not then be submitted to 
the WTO and vice versa. 
This paper does not address the issue of disputes between private parties. It is interesting 
to note, however, that a NAFTA Advisory Committee under Article 2022 was specifically 
tasked with considering 'the availability, use and effectiveness of arbitration and other 
procedures for resolution of private international commercial disputes in the free trade 
agreement' (1996:1). A preliminary report found that there was a wide range of arbitral 
institutions in all three countries and that four of these had created a hemispheric body, the 
Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Centre for the Americas, in December 1995, leading 
the committee to conclude that there was no need for the NAFTA governments to create a 
new organization in this area. On the other hand, the governments (or a NAFTA body) could 
usefully promote knowledge about arbitration and conciliation/mediation mechanisms etc 





Chapter 19 -. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Matters 
STAGE 
*Capendar days (NAFTA Article 201) 





Request for panel review o 
Complaints filed 30 30 
Notice of appearance filed 45 after request 45 
Panel selection 55 after request 55 
Final determination, reasons, admin. 
record etc filed 15 after notice 60 
Complainants' brief filed 60 after admin record 120 
Investigating authority briefs filed 60 after complainants' brief 180 
Reply briefs filed 15 after authority briefs 195 
Appendix to briefs filed 10 after reply 205 
Oral arguments begin 30 after reply 225 
Panel decision due 315 
Chapter 20 Other Matters 
Consultations 30 30 
Meeting of Free Trade Commission 
(cabinet level) 10 40 
Request panel 30 days after commission sleet 70 
Third party may join as com plainant 1 days from panel request 77 
Parties agree on panel chair 15 from panel request 85 
Establish terms of reference 20 from panel request 90 
Panel selection 15 after chair 100 
Initial written submission 10 days after panel selected 110 
Written counter-submission 20 days after initial subsiission 130 
Third party written submission 20 days after initial submission 130 
List of those attending hearing 5 days before hearing 
Hearing held to be determined by chair 
Supplementary written submission 10 days after hearing 
Request for scientific review board 15 days after hearing 
Initial report filed 90 days after panel selected 190 
Comments on initial report filed 14 days after initial report 204 
Final report 30 days after initial report 234 
NAFTAS SIDE AGREEMENTS 
Although the side-agreements are not strictly part of the NAFTA, they are considered here 
briefly as they have provided a regional framework for dealing with disputes in the areas of 
environment and labour. This has not been to the satisfaction of all groups, but it has 
reduced the use of unilateral mechanisms, and perhaps added some useful experience if 
the matters are to be addressed within the hemispheric or multilateral context. 
Both agreements emphasize technical cooperation as a way of building understanding 
about various standards, the extent to which they are equivalent and the scope for upward 
harmonization. But the agreements provide for trade sanctions in only a few cases, and 
then it is only where a country is found repeatedly not to be implementing its national 
policies -- it will not be judged according to a NAFTA norm. 
In the case of labour, once a government has decided to act on a complaint from a 
domestic source, it brings the matter for consultation by the council of labour ministers. If 
there is agreement to determine whether the matter is trade-related and falls into a shortlist 
of certain areas, it can be 
referred to an expert group For only three types of labour standard -- child 
for evaluation. For only labour, health and safety, and minimum wage 
three types of labour 
standard -- child labour, -- can the matter be taken to an expert pane! 
health and safety, and for review. 
minimum wage -- can the 
matter be taken to an expert panel for review. If the panel find a persistent failure of the 
government in question to implement these labour standards, then the complaining party 
may take retaliatory action -- either withdraw trade privileges or, in cases against Canada, 
ask for a fine to be imposed. 
In the case of the environment, an environmental secretariat will consider cases brought 
directly by organizations or individuals. If there is persistent non-enforcement of national 
standards and is related to trade, an arbitral panel may investigate following agreement by 
two of the three countries. If the panel's findings are not acted upon, there may also be fines 
or trade sanctions. 
When the CUSFIA and then the NAFTA were signed, they appeared to offer advantages 
over both the domestic review process and that available under the GATT, in terms of 
scope, timelines and effectiveness (binding DS of trade remedy cases). For instance, 
without remarids the average review process in the US was 734 days, while in Canada the 
average was 462 days (Penner 1996:4-2). Some of these advantages were diminished with 
the new WTO rules (Lipsey 1994:129). Similarly there have been changes to shorten the 
time for domestic review procedures (Penner 1996:4-3). 
INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE NAFTA DISPUTE SEULEMENT MECHANISMS 
Amongst other reactions at the time of signing the NAFTA were: 
Disappointment with the failure to create new trinational rules for dumping and 
countervailing duties, let alone to replace antidumping with competition law. 
Concern about the lengthening of disputes and the weakening of panel findings by 
allowing its reversal by an extraordinary challenge committee. 
Criticism of the requirement that Chapter 19 panellists be judges or ex-judges rather than 
non-legal experts (the evidence being that judges tend to defer to administrative agencies' 
judgement -- according to Boddez and Trebilcock cited in Lipsey 1994:130). In contrast, 
Chapter 20 panellists may have broader expertise -- in law, international trade, or other 
matters covered by the agreement (Article 2009). 
For cases involving environmental, sanitary or phytosanitary safeguards, it was thought 
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that some of the dispute rules might work against smaller countries like Canada and 
Mexico. For instance, the country whose standards are being challenged may limit the 
review to being considered under the NAFTA (Article 2005.3-4), and also a Party asserting 
that a sanitary of phytosanitary measure of another Party is inconsistent with this Section 
shall have the burden of establishing the inconsistency' (Article 723). Similar rules applied 
for standards (Article 914) whereas in the GATT the standards were looser, namely that the 
measures could cause a barrier (Lipsey 1994:132-3). 
D. MERCOSUR'S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT RULES 
The MERCOSUR DS system was set up by the Brasilia Protocol, signed in December 1991. 
It was supposed to be temporary until the negotiation of a new MERCOSUR institutional 
structure to deal with the custom union, which was supposed to become effective at the end 
of December 1994. However, the Ouro Preto Protocol of December 1994, which set out 
MERCOSUR's institutional structure ,and came into force in mid-December 1995, ratified the 
system created under the Brasilia Protocol, adding new possibilities for dispute settlement. 
The two protocols, considered together, provide four ways to deal with disputes: bilateral 
negotiations, consultations in fron of the Trade Commission (a creation of the Ouro 
Preto Protocol), claims before the Trade Commission and the Common Market Group 
(CMG), and arbitration. 
As for the type of conflicts, it must be noted that MERCOSUR's organs are inter- 
governmental and make decisions by consensus of all members, thus it is not possible to 
have a juridical conflict between a state and a MERCOSUR resolution since a country's 
presence and consent is required to pass each binding decision. In addition, states must 
always be part of the conflict, as conflict exclusively among individuals is governed by 
national laws. So the dispute procedures apply to conflicts between two states or between 
states and individuals or companies. 
As shown in Table 3 below, On the other hand, there may be a cost in that 
under the Brasilia Protocol, 
disputes are first the subject the pragmatism means the system lacks pre- 
of direct negotiations for dictability. 
fifteen days, during which 
time the CMG is kept informed on the stage and result of negotiations. If an agreement is not 
reached, the countries involved may submit the dispute to the CMG, for a recommendation 
within 30 days. The CMG will hear all affected parties and eventually may ask for technical 
advice if necessary. The expenses of this process are shared equally between the disputants, 
unless the CMG determines otherwise. 
If there is still a disagreement, the parties may go to binding arbitration. The Arbitration 
Tribunal is constituted ad-hoc each time a conflict needs to be addressed according to the 
nature of particular cases. Three arbiters consider each case, one from each of the 
countries involved and one from a third country, who acts as the President of the Tribunal. 
If necessary, the third arbiter will be chosen by the Administrative Secretariat from a 
previously created list of candidates. More than one state may hold the same position in a 
controversy, in which case they must unify their representation before the Tribunal. 
If there is enough evidence to consider that the maintenance of the current situation will 
cause irreversible damages to one party, the tribunal may make an interim ruling to prevent 
this. Otherwise, the tribunal has 60 days to rule and settle the conflict, with an extra 30 days 
if needed. The judgement must be adopted by majority -- the votes are kept secret as are 
the details of any opposing views. The tribunal's decision is binding, with no scope for 
appeal, nor can the same issue be submitted for arbitration a second time. 
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The judgment must be honored within fifteen days, unless otherwise decided by the tribunal; 
also, the defending country may ask for clarification of the judgement. If it does not comply 
with the arbitration ruling within a reasonable period of time, then the other country is 
authorized to withdraw trade concessions or adopt temporary compensatory measures. 
In cases involving natural and juridical individuals, Chapter V of the Brasilia Protocol 
requires a claim first to be submitted to the National Bureau (Sección Nacional) of the CMG 
in their respective country, along with the evidence to show that a state action has 
restricted, discriminated or allowed unfair competition contrary to the treaty. If the national 
bureau decides to take up the case, it may consult with the national bureau of the other 
country or else submit the matter to the 0MG. In turn, the CMG, after an evaluation may 
reject the claim or call for a panel of experts to consider the case in 30 days and request 
the state to modify the rules or measures. If the country does not comply within 15 days, it 
is possible to go to arbitration directly, that is, avoiding direct negotiations and the 
procedure before the CMG. 
In turn, the Ouro Preto Protocol created the Trade Commission, an inter-governmental 
organ to advise the CMG and take binding decisions by consensus (in case of disputes, 
the consent of the defending state is required). It includes four members for every 
country and four alternates, with each country deciding from which area of the 
government to take its representatives. 
TABLE 3. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
PROCEDURES IN MERCOSUR 
BRASILIA PROTOCOL 
V 
Direct Negotiations (15 
days to solve the conflict) 
Claim before the 0MG (30 days 
to make a recommendation) y 
Experts (30 days) 
(mandatory in cases initiated by individuals 
except where consensus not to do so) y 
CMG 
If this fails 
Arbitral Tribunal ( 60-90 days to rule) 
y 
Compliance (15 days) y 
If no compliance 
compensatory measures authorized 
OURO PRETO PROTOCOL 
y 
Consultations before the 
Trade Commission 
If this fails y 
Claim before the Trade Commission 
If this fails y 
Technical Commiffee (30 days) 
y 
Trade Commission y 
If this fails y 
Claim before CMG (30 days) 
y 
Arbitral Tribunal (following Brasilia Protocol) 
Note: the pursuit of disputes through one protocoi does not biock the use of the other. 
CMG Common Market Group 
TCM Trade Commission of MERCOSUR 
19 
The Trade Commission has created 
nine technical committees: Tariffs and 
Custom Issues; Trade Norms; Public 
Policies that distort competitiveness; 
Competition Policy; Unfair Trade and 
Safeguards; Consumers Protection; 
Non Tariff Barriers; Automotive Sector; 
and Teetile Sector. 
When LAFTA was replaced by LAIA ici 
1980 (Latin Americen Integration 
Association(, the [AFTA Dispute 
Settlement Protocol expired. 
The AC organs with capacity to create 
community law are the Foreign 
Relations Ministers Council (It con- 
sists of the members' Foreign Affairs 
Ministers and can issue declarations 
and decisions. Its Decisions constitute 
community norms); the Commission: 
It is the most important legislative 
source of the AC. It consists of the 
members' Trade Ministers; and the 
General Secretariat: It is the executi- 
ve organ and is formed by a Secretary 
General and three General Directors. 
The Trade Commission handles consultations and Claims, whether by a state or an individual 
(natural or juridical) and involving situations foreseen bythe Brasilia Protocol (Articles ito 25) 
and related to the commission's area of expertise. Claims made to the commission can also 
be pursued subsequently through the CMG. After the matter ¡s discussed at the first 
commission meeting, if no decision is reached it is submitted to a Technical Committee.5 
Within 30 days, the committee should issue its opinions (whether joint or individual if there is 
no agreement). If the Trade Commission cannot reach a consensus, it must submit an outline 
of the different positions on the subject to the CMG, which in turn has 30 days to decide on 
the matter. If the CMG, by consensus, agrees with the complainant, it will set a time by which 
the defending state must comply with its recommendations. If however there is still no 
consensus, the matter can be taken to the Arbitral Tribunal under Chapter IV of the Brasilia. 
In summary, the system created for handling disputes under MERCOSUR is one with a lot 
of flexibility, whether in terms of the choice over the mechanism used. On the other hand, 
there may be a cost in that the pragmatism means the system lacks predictability -- the 
debate over a 'power-oriented' as opposed to a 'rule-oriented' system is similar to debates 
heard in the context of the GATT (see J. Jackson and K. Dam). 
E. ANDEAN COMMUNITY DISPUTE SEULEMENT RULES 
Originally, disputes were handled through good will offices and negotiations by the 
Commission, an intergovernmental executive organ of the Andean Pact. If not satisfactorily 
resolved, parties could use the DS procedures set up in the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA).6 In 1979, the Andean Pact members created a permanent Court of 
Justice to "declare the community law, solve differences and interpret the Cartagena 
Agreement.' However, the Court's working procedures were not approved until 1983, and 
it only began work in 1984. 
In May 1987, through the Quito Protocol, members agreed to reform the institutional 
framework of the Andean Pact, including the Court. There were further institutional 
changes in 1996 through the Protocolo de Trujillo, The Andean Pact was renamed Andean 
Community (AC) and three new organs were established: the General Secretariat, the 
Andean Presidential Council and the Andean Foreign Relations Ministers Council. Finally, 
in 1999 the Cochabamba Protocol introduced new changes, giving the Court new 
functions, as arbiter for instance. 
Two principles governing 
the AC legal system make 
its DS procedures quite 
different from those of 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR. 
First, AC norms have direct 
effect on a member's domestic legal system, i.e. they have full effect domestically without 
any individual government action. Second, the community law has supremacy over national 
norms; if there is a contradiction between a domestic and community norm, the latter 
prevails. In addition, the Court applies and interprets the community norms and may bind 
states without requiring their consent. Other than the Court rulings, the sources of 
community law are: treaties among AC members, decisions by the Foreign Relations 
Ministers Council and the Commission, and General Secretariat resolutions.7 
The Court, based in Quito, Ecuador, consists of five judges, one national from every AC 
member (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), elected for 6 years with 
reelection possible once. It has jurisdiction over cases involving nullification, non- 
compliance, and pretrial interpretation. 
In cases of non-compliance, before a case goes to the Court, a mandatory administrative 
procedure has to be followed. The General Secretariat (GS) may initiate a case prompted 
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AC norms have dfrect effect on a member's 
domestic legal system and the community law 
has supremacy over national norms. 
by its own research, or a request by member states or individuals. An 'observation note' is 
sent to the member under investigation, setting out the details of possible non-compliance 
to which a response is required within a certain time. It may then issue a non-compliance 
report' requiring prompt corrective action. The report may be appealed before both the 
Secretariat and the Court, but in the meantime, compliance with the report is required8, 
failing which the Secretariat may take the matter to the Court. 
Non-compliance concerns a member's failure to meet its obligations under the AC norms 
or to comply with a GS report.9 The Court may order the suspension or restriction of AC 
benefits for the non-complying member. 
Nullification concerns the legality of some community institutions' acts.'° The Court 
investigates Commission decisions and GS resolutions considered to violate norms of the AC 
juridical system. Such cases may be brought by the Commission, the GS, individual 
members (but only from the member that had not voted in favor of the Commission decision 
being challenged), corporations or individual people directly affected by the AC norms. 
Finally, pretrial interpretation by the AC Court may be sought by domestic courts in cases 
involving AC norms, as it is the only tribunal authorized to do this interpretation, which 
binds the domestic court." 
In terms of procedure, once the case is admitted the Court first notifies the defendant, who 
has 30 days to respond. A period may be allowed for producing evidence and for an 
audience with the parties, after which the Court has 15 days to rule. It may nullify a norm, 
decision or resolution. In cases of non-compliance, the Court will establish corrective 
measures to be taken by the defendant, from the day after the public reading of the ruling. 
Appeals are allowed for amendment, amplification, explanation and revision. 
As we already noted, the Cochabamba Protocol gave new functions to the Court: to solve 
cases of AC organs' omissions or inaction when they are obliged to act; to work as arbiters 
when requested; and to look upon labour controversies within the AC organs and institutions. 
In addition, individuals can submit a case directly before the Court in cases of countries' non 
compliance and the ruling they obtain from the Court is a legal endowment to suit for the 
damages suffered as a consequence of the non-compliance in domestic courts. 
One concern that has emerged is the overlapping juridical framework, including the dispute 
settlement system, which has emerged in the Andean region as AC members have 
negotiated agreements with other countries, as in the Group of Three (G3) - Colombia, 
Venezuela and Mexico. Any dispute between Colombia and Venezuela over issues covered 
by AC and G3 Treaty norms, will be settled in the AC Court using its norms, whereas 
disputes between them over exclusively G3 issues will be covered by the latter treaty, as will 
any dispute involving Mexico. Difficulties are anticipated as these systems are based on 
different legal traditions (Cárdenas, 1994). 
In summary, under the Andean Community's dispute settlement system, member states 
have resigned their control over conflict resolution to the Court. The Court's jurisdiction is 
not consensual but compulsory and the process adjudicatory. An interesting characteristic 
is the General Secretariat's capacity to act without a member's request in order to protect 
and guarantee the Community's interest in members' compliance with community rules. 
This contrasts sharply with MERCOSUR where states have retained control by placing 
negotiation at the core of the system and only using arbitration as a last resort. 
F. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
In terms of countries' blocking power, the rules are very different. While the WTO is automatic', 
giving little chance to countries to block the process, MERCOSUR is very flexible, giving member 
countries blocking power at every stage of the process (except the arbitral tribunal). 
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if the member decides to appeal the 
report before the Secretariat, it must ask 
for a reconsideration, If it decides to 
appeal the report to the Court. t must 
do so through an action of nullification. 
Non compliance Action: chapter lii, 
Second Section. Articles 23-27, 
Treaty creating the court of Justice. 
'o. 
Nullification Action, Chapter iii, First 
Section. Articles 17, 18.19.20.21 and 
22, Treaty creating the Court of Justice. 
11. 
Pretrial Interpretation: Chapter Ill, 
Third Section, Articles 28-31, Treaty 
creating the Court of Justice. 
Another observation to be made is that while NAFTA has different processes according to 
the issue (i.e. if it is dumping, one kind of process, if investment, another), MERCOSUR does 
not make any difference according to the issue, whether in terms of process or timelines. 
The WTO's DS, in turn, is an unified system for all the issues covered by the Agreements. 
Other points to note: 
Third party rights are more generous under NAFTA (for Chapter 20 cases) than under WTO. 
All procedures are relatively secretive, and do not disclose minority views, though the 
\NTO panel reports are released more quickly than the NAFTA (10 days compared to 15). 
MERCOSUR's DS system is based on negotiation and with little legal enforcement 
procedures. 
NAFTA cases are speedier than WTO, and MERCOSUR's are even faster, once a case has 
entered into the tribunal pipeline. 
NAFTA uses judges for Chapter 19 cases, whereas for Chapter 20 panelists may have a 
broader range of skills, as they do for the WTO. MERCOSUR roster of arbiters is composed 
exclusively by lawyers. 
NAFTA panels allow for the inclusion of nationals from the countries involved in the case, 
whereas the WTO does not. MERCOSUR requires as the tribunal's arbiters one selected by 
each country from the roaster (nationals) and the third one can be from another country, 
even a non MERCOSUR member. 
SECTION III 
USE OF THE DIFFERENT DS MECHANISMS 
We now review the use of the different regional and multilateral DS mechanisms. We 
present, in fairly aggregated terms, the numbers and kinds of disputes being brought for 
resolution by different categories of countries. 
A. USE OF THE WTO DISPUTE SEULEMENT SYSTEM 
There has been a sharp increase in the number of cases brought for resolution, whether 
for consultation or for panel review; in the first five years of its existence (to September 
2000), there were 204 complaints notified to the WTO (161 of which involved distinct 
matters). In addition, there are 19 active panels and 38 were solved using the system 
(WTO, September 2000). 
A large number of developing countries have made use of the system to bring cases against 
developed countries as well as other developing countries. According to one view, this 
suggests that the new system provides greater equality of access than was available under 
the GATT (Brazil 1998). Many smaller countries have brought cases, and won, against 
larger trading partners, as illustrated by Costa Rica's case against the US on underwear. In 
terms of regional distribution, there were no cases brought by an African WTO member, 
though a few countries were involved as third parties (for example in the banana case 
against the EU and the shrimp case against the US), while South Africa was a defendant 
in a case brought by India. Table 4 shows that of the total number of complaints, 26% were 
brought by developing countries compared to 16% under the GATT, The bulk of developing 
country cases were against developed countries. 
Overall, developed countries brought the most cases, and more than their share of world 
exports (see Table 4). The largest number of cases were still between developed countries 
(43% of the total); but it is the share of total cases which were brought by developed against 
developing countries that appears to have increased the most --from 10% in the GATT to 
31% in the WTO. Over 40% of developed country cases were against developing countries, 
which is more than the developing countries' 27% share of developed countries' exports in 
1998. Likewise for developing countries, their cases against developed countries were 
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higher than might have been expected (66% of all developing country complaints 
compared to 57% of developing country exports). 
One interesting characteristic is the frequency with which a number of developed countries 
have brought the same or similar complaints against a single developing country - for 
instance, six countries brought separate cases against India's quantitative restrictions, four 
against Indonesia's measures concerning autos, and three countries against Brazil's auto 
investment regime. Developing countries have not coordinated their complaints in the same 
way (Michalopoulos 1999:134), though there are a few examples of groups bringing a case 
jointly against a defending country (as in the case of bananas and shrimps, for example). 
TABLE 4. WTO DISPUTES BY CATEGORY OF COUNTRY 
(JANUARY 1995- SEPTEMBER 2000) 
Note: Based on number of cases brought by each country 
The EU and member countries are counted jointly 
n.a. not available 
Derived from: WTO 2000 and Kuruvila 1997, nd IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 1999. 
In terms of issues that have been raised and sectoral coverage, Table 5 shows that most 
cases involved antidumping and tariffs/quotas, followed by subsidies/countervail and 
TRIPs, while most (90 cases) concerned industrial products, followed by agriculture (56 
cases). These numbers should not be given too much weight, however, given that as many 
as one third of all the cases were not easily classified in terms of the issues raised, while 
for a fifth more than one sector was involved. 
Note: alcoholic beverages included under agriculture 
Source: derived from WTO, Overview of the State-of.Play of WTO Disputes, 

















NOT SPECIFIED OR 
MORE THAN 1 CATEGORY 
AD 11 18 29 
Tariffs/Quotas 9 7 9 25 
Subsidies 2 13 5 20 
TRIPS 1 3 16 20 
Safeguards 4 11 15 
TBT/SPS 10 4 14 
GATS 4 4 
> one of the above, 
orotherWToAgreements 19 35 2 14 70 







(% OF WORLD 
IMPORTS, 1998) 
Against: 
Developed countries 89 35 124 60% (68%) 
Developing countries 65 18 83 40% (32%) 
Total 154 53 207 100% 
% 74% 26% 100% 
For comparison: 
Share of GATT DS cases 84% 16% 100% 
(% of world exports, 1998) (67%) (33%) 
By far the largest single user has been the US, bringing some 61 cases. The US has also 
been a leading defendant, with some 42 cases, and has been involved in many others as 
a third party. Second most active has been the EU (with 51 and 41 cases respectively), 
followed by Canada (10 and 16 - in addition Canada participated as a third party in 32 
other DS matters). 
It is not surprising, then, that most of the cases from 1995 to 2000 involved countries in 
the Western hemisphere in one way or another. Of the cases to date, some 43 (about 20%) 
have not involved the Western hemisphere at all, though even in some of these, they may 
have claimed third country rights. 
It appears that there were a large number of cases in which both the complainant and the 
respondent were from within the Western hemisphere (see Table 6). For instance: 
Canada and the US 
Mexico and the US 
Guatemala and Mexico 
Peru and Brazil 
Venezuela and Mexico 
Venezuela and the US 
For Latin America, there were 33 cases (counting each complainant country separately) 
in which they were involved as complainants and 43 as defendants. Brazil was the most 
implicated -- with 7 cases as complainant and 11 as defendant, followed by Argentina 
(2 and 12 respectively) 
and Mexico (6 and 5) By far the largest single user has been the US, 
Twelve other countries bringingsome6lcases. The US has also beena 
were also involved in cases 
either as complainants or leading defendant, with some 42 cases, and has 
defendants. Although it been involved in many others as a third party. 
was most usual for 
countries to be involved in Second most active has been the EU (with 51 
cases on an individual and 41 cases respectively), followed by Canada 
basis, there were various 
examples of joint corn- (10 and 16 in addition Canada parti-cipated as 
plaints (e.g. Brazil and a third party in 32 other DS matters). 
Venezuela against US gas 
standards; Argentina, Canada and the US with 3 others against Hungary's agricultural 
export subsidies, and the banana case with the US against the EU) and joint action as 
third parties (e.g. the US, Canada, Honduras and El Salvador in the cement case by 
Mexico against Guatemala). 
Only one dispute was brought to the WTO by a MERCOSUR member against another; this 
involved a Brazilian complaint about an Argentine safeguard on textiles. After the favorable 
report for Brazil in the ATC Committee, Brazil brought Argentina before an arbitral tribunal 
in MERCOSUR, which ruled against Argentina. 
In the case of the Andean Community, the relationship with the multilateral trading 
system is relatively recent with three of the five joining in the last decade - 
Venezuela and Bolivia in 1990 and Ecuador in 1995. Prior to the WTO's formation, 
there were two disputes brought to the GATT involving member countries. First, 
Colombia joined Brazil in its complaint about US tobacco import restrictions. 
Another complaint concerned the US embargo on Colombian and Venezuelan tuna, 
following amendment of the US Marine Mammal Protection Act, banning imports of 
tuna caught using the "encircling" method, that might entangle dolphins. The case 
was brought to the GATT by Mexico, with Colombia and Venezuela participating as 
interested parties. 
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Subsequently there have been various cases involving one or more AC members as 
complainants, notably the cases involving EU banana imports,12 US gas standards and US 
safeguards on corn brooms. Two cases have involved them as defendants, Peruvian duties on 
Brazilian buses, and Venezuelan duties on oil tubes. Finally, the region was implicated in a 
Brazilian case against EU preferential tariff treatment of AC and CACM soluble coffee exports. 
More generally, an important point to note here is that the region has displayed an active 
interest in the WTO's DS procedures with Venezuela and Colombia playing a key role in a 




Derived from WTO (2000). Overview of the Sta a-of-play of WTO Disputes. September 6, 2000, 
httpí/www.wto.orglwto/dispute/buietin.htm, consulted September 8,2000. 
Normal cases are under consultation 
Bob! italicized are settled without going to panel 
Italicized cases are active (post consultations) 
Bold cases are implemented 
B. USE OF NAFTA 
As in the case of the WTO, the large number of cases heard under the NAFTA DS is 
considered a measure of its success. Table 7 shows as many as 60 cases - including those 
that are both active and completed-- have been brought under Chapters 19 and 20 since 
the NAFTA came into being. The US has been the most involved as both complainant and 
defendant, while Canada came second as defendant and Mexico was second as 
complainant. The share of cases defended by all three countries is roughly proportionate to 
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In fact, resolving the banana access 
issue may have been one of the reasons 
for Ecuadorjoining the WTO in 1995. 
An Advisory Centra on WTO Law. A 
Working Proposal developed by 
Bangladash, Colombia, Hong Kong. 
China, The Netherlands, Norway, The 
Philippines, South Africa. Tanzania, 
lunisia, Turkey. United Kingdom and 
Venezuela. October 1998. This would 
provide a range of legal services to 
developing countries (and economies 
n transition) Userfees would be 
charged on a sliding scale. partly sub- 
sidised by an endowment fund (US$9 
million) and contributions for the first 
five years (totalling US$5 million), for 
which contributions are presently 
being sought from all countries. An 
agreement creating the Centre was 
signed by some 20 countries in 
Seattle in December 1999. 
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their share of intra-regional imports. For complaints, Mexico brought nearly twice as many 
complaints as might have been expected given its share of intra-regional exports, while both 
the Canadian and US complaints were somewhat less than might have been expected. 
These procedures have been under review in various working groups created under the 
NAFTA. The NAFTA Trade Remedies Working Groups in 1997 made a proposal for the 
governments to increase notification of anti-dumping and countervail action, to make 
documents available to the public during the case, and where possible to make various 
changes in the calculation of dumping levels and the determination of injury. For instance, 
The Parties agree to rely on a company's financial statements as much as possible in 
determining profit for purposes of calculating dumping margins' (NAFTA Trade Remedies 
Working Groups 1997:3). 
Only 4 of the 60 cases were under Chapter 20, and none involved the extraordinary 
challenge committee. The official Canadian government position is that the Chapter 19 
process has worked well -- one study estimates that in 9 out of 14 cases, the duties were 
reduced following a binational panel review (Mercury cited in Howse 1998:6). Nonetheless 
the government still strongly advocates significant reform if not elimination of the trade 
remedy system within NAFTA. Despite the clear success of Chapter Nineteen under the 
FTAandthe NAFTA, Canada continuesto believethattheapplication oftrade remedies has 
no place in a free-trade area' (Canada DFAIT 1997:3). 
Source: NAFTA: A Partnershp at Work, DFAIT Jurie 1997, arid NAFTA Secretariat, Vay 2000. 
Procedures for dealing with investor-state disputes are not in the public domain, making it 
difficult to obtain information about the number of complaints that have been brought and 
resolved. Most of those shown in the table have been the subject of a NAFTA tribunal, 
though without any public hearings. By September 2000, of the ten complaints known to 
have been raised, one was resolved privately, and the rest were the subject of a NAFTA 
tribunal, with three decisions rendered. 
C. USE OF MERCOSUR 
By far the most active part of the MERCOSUR's procedures has been the consultation and 
claim process before the Trade Commission. Sensitive cases such as autos and sugar are 
being resolved through bilateral negotiations. Only three cases have been brought for 
arbitration (2 in 1999 and 1 in 2000). 
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TABLE 7. COMPLAINTS UNDER THE 
NAFTA DS (1994-MAY 2000) 
COMPLAINTS BY 
AGAiNST Canada Mexico US Total 100% 
Canada 2 14 16 27 (31%) 
Mexico 3 8 11 18 (15%) 
US 14 19 33 55 (54%) 
Total 17 21 22 60 100 
100% 28 35 37 100 
(% share of intra- 
regional exports, 1998) (35%) (20%) (45%) 
* cases are brought by investors aga nst a government; two additiona cases have involved Mexico 
Sources: NAFTA: A Partnership at Work, OFAIT June 1997, NAFTA Secretariat, 2000, and various newspaper reports. 
Note: In May 2000, there were 13 active cases under Chapter 19 and 20. The table does not include 17 cases which 
were terminated without any decision being issued, i.e. by consensus, by the parties, etc. 
As Table 9 shows, the number of consultations has declined sharply, from as many as 128 
consultations during 1995 to as few as 36 in 1999. One of the reasons might be a greater 
familiarity and understanding of the rules and workings of the Customs union; in 1995 as 
many as 80% of the cases were settled after members provided the required information. 
At the same time, the share of cases satisfactorily concluded has fallen, with a growing 
number pending resolution. This reflects a lack of political will to deal with disagreements 
through the claims process. 
One interesting feature is that in some cases there have been references to the GATT/WTO 
to justify the policies under investigation. For instance, 
In 1995: Argentina's paper imports from Uruguay and Brazil; Argentina's payments on 
textile exports. 
In 1996: Brazil's tire imports, and Argentina's system of duty drawbacks and other 
related policies. 
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TABLE 8. USE OF NAFTA DS 
1994 1995 1996 1991 1998 1999 2000 
CASES UNDER CH 19 





11 9 10 2 
Concluded None 1 8 panel 
decisions issued 
in 1996 
3 4 6 
CASES IJNDER CH 20 
Initiated None One lagriculture) 11 consultations 
an 10 matters of 










Concluded None None One panel report 
issued 
lagriculture) 




CASES UNDER CH 11 
Fuel additive - 





US; Metal waste 
- US case 
against Meoico; 
PCB waste - US 
case against 
Canada; Water - 









- US case 
against Canada 
*ThIs was the Only claim not preceded by consultations. 
Source: derived from the Actas de la Comisión de Comercio until March 2000. 
In 1997: two cases involving Argentina's anti-dumping duties on Brazilian exports and 
Brazil's restrictions on ammunition imports. 
In 1999: in an arbitration case, Brazil defended its computerized import licensing 
system on the grounds that it conformed with the WTO Import Licensing Agreement. 
In 2000: the arbitration case on textiles resulted from Argentine safeguard action 
applied under the ATC. 
In addition a number of The number of consultations has declined 
consultations clearly could 
have been handled in the sharply, from as many as 128 consultations du- 
WTO. For Instance In 1997, ring 1995 to as few as 36 in 1999. 
besides the cases noted 
above, others involved export credit incentives and fiscal incentives. This suggests that 
Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay have chosen to use the regional system for disputes that 
could have been brought to the world stage. 
By far the largest initiator of consultations has been Argentina, as the above table shows; it has 
brought more than half of all cases, two-thirds of them against Brazil. 
A S S S» 
. S i5 S 
To 
FROM Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay TOTAL. 
Source: derived from the Actas de la comisión de Comercio until March 2000. 
Note: some of the consultations were made jointly against 
the same country, while in other cases one country brought 
the same case against more than one other. 
28 
TABLE 9. USE OF MERCOSUR'S DS SYSTEM 
TOTAl. ALL 
1995 1996 1991 1998 1999 
YEARS 
CONSULTATIONS IN THE MTC 128 84 71 32 39 354 
Satisfactorily concludedf 
121 (94%) 74(88%) 52 (73%) 17 (53%) 2 (5%) 266 
Unsatisfactorily concluded 7(5%) 5(6%) 8(11%) 6(19%) 1(2.5%) 27 
Pending 
0 5(6%) 11(15%) 9 (28%) 36(92%) 61 
Claims before the MTC 
- 1 2 3 1 * 7 
Claims directed to the CMG 
- 2 3 1 7 
Arbitral Tribunals 
- 2 2 
Argenhna 134 15 37 186 
Brazil 73 4 14 91 
Paraguay 18 13 6 37 
uruguay 17 18 4 39 
TOTAL 108 165 23 57 352 
D. USE OF AN DEAN PACT 
Between 1969 and 1979 
the Andean Commission 
was in charge of negotia- 
tion, mediation and conci- 
liation. Once the Court was 
in operation, 'for several 
years, only the adminis- 
trative step of the system 
was used: the Junta 
carried forward some non- 
compliance cases, some 
of which resulted in the 
issue of 'observation 
notes.' It was only in 1996 
that the first case of non- 
compliance was submitted 
before the Court" (Lloreda 
Ricaurte, 1998). 
As Table 11 shows, the pre 
judicial interpretation is 
intensively used in the 
Andean Pact dispute 
settlement system. 
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Source: derived from information avaJable at www.comunidadandina.org and 
information provided by the court of Justice. Up dated until August 2000. 
SECTION IV 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We now turn to review some of the strengths and weak-nesses that have become apparent 
with the use and experience of dispute settlement mechanisms, and some of proposals for 
change that are already on the table. 
A. EVALUATION OF THE WTO DS SYSTEM 
In many respects the high hopes of the new DS mechanism appear to have been borne out 
in practice. As a Brazilian diplomat has noted: "There are count-less aspects of the DS 
understanding which could be the object of impro-vements, major or not. On the whole, 
however ... it is a well-conceived mechanism, which has worked well towards the fulfillment 
of the objectives of the WTO" (Brazil 1998). For its part, the Canadian government has stated 
that, "as a frequent user of the system, Canada believes the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding has clearly demonstrated its fundamental effectiveness and viability" 
(1999a:1) and in the course of the review due to end on July 31, 1999, Canada did not 
consider broad changes were needed.'8 
Experience with the DS mechanism has tempered the initial enthusiasm surrounding its 
introduction, and led to several suggestions for change. These address capacity, 
implementation and authority. 
The Court rejected the case arguing 
that the company - Alumnnio 
Reynolds - should litigate in the 
domestic court. 
Three of these cases were rejected 
One, involving a Colombian national. 
was rejected without consideration of 
the substance because it concerned 
the Barahorna Act, which was outside 
the competence of the Court. Another 
was rejected as the claimant, a 
Colombian company, could not prove 
injury as a result of the norm n ques- 
tion. The third was rejected for the 
same reason. 
None of the three presentations were 
admitted by the Court because the 
norms had already been derogated 
from domestic courts. 
One petition was not admitted. 
The WTO OS rules were te be reviewed 
within four years of the WTOs initia- 
tion i.e. by January 1999 (Decision on 
the Application and Review of the 
Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes. GATT 1994:465). The 
review continued until july 1999 and 
informally thereafter. Some changes 
were to be considered for adoption at 
the Seattle Ministerial meeting but 
these were shelved when the meeting 
collapsed (Raghavan 2000). 








1985 1 - - 
1986 2 - - 
1987 - 1 1 
1988 - - 4 
1989 - - 6 
1990 - - 6 
1991 - - 3 
1992 415 316 
1993 - 717 
1994 - - 10 
1995 - - 34 
1996 1 3 33 
1997 5 3 32 
1998 3 10 45 
1999 3 14 41 
2000 6 17 51 
TOTAL 25 48 236 
CAPACITY 
The DS mechanism may be in danger of overload without additional resources being made 
available at many levels. The number of disputes is projected to keep rising, particularly as 
developing countries' exemptions expire (e.g. for TRIPs and TRIMs) (Brewer and Young 
1999:178). Also, submissions and reports are becoming more technical and lengthier than 
the 20-30 pages average under the GATT. As Planck-Brumback notes, "Panels are 
producing huge reports faster than the secretariat can translate and distribute them to all 
members... Panel reports of several hundred pages are being issued fortnightly faster than 
the trading community can understand" (1998:26), In response, the WTO Secretariat's 
capacity needs to be expanded. 
Secondly, there is a need to expand the roster of panellists. With a growing number 
of countries involved in cases (as third parties if not directly) their nationals cannot be 
used as panellists. The increasing time involved in cases can place overwhelming 
demands on official representatives of smaller, developing country WTO members, 
who often have other non-WTO business in Geneva. One suggestion has been to 
create a permanent roster of panellists, as for the AB, although the latter has been 
criticized (see below). 
There is a more general 
concern about the capacity 
of developing countries, 
especially the poorer and 
smaller WTO members, to 
participate in DS. Questions have been raised about their capacity, whether as 
complainants to bring cases effectively, or as defendants to protect their interests, given the 
level of technical expertise required. Cou pled with the tighter dispute process deadlines this 
has led to intensity of work which many governments are unable to meet.'9 
Even though technical assistance is available from the WTO Secretariat, it is seriously 
constrained, given the large number of cases now underway.2° Moreover, most WTO 
technical assistance is not intended to provide counsel on specific cases so much as to 
advise on ssues. (n the majority of cases involving developing countries, external legal 
counsel has been sought from an international law firm or consultant at considerable 
cost (ACWL 1998:7). Initially there were worries about the need for governments to have 
their own lawyers to represent them; but this changed with the decision by the Appellate 
Body in one of the banana cases to allow the St. Lucia government to be represented 
by a private lawyer. 21 
In this respect, the Advisory Centre on WTO Law will play a useful role. At the very least, it 
could provide governments with an assessment of how to proceed with a case, thus 
reducing legal costs. It could advise member countries, particularly smaller ones, about the 
scope for economies through joint presentation of complaints, or through joint participation 
as third parties. Where private counsel is hired through the Centre, they could be required 
to go beyond the provision of legal advice to build up a precedent manual for use in future 
cases by the developing country government in question. 22 
The Centre might also Consider helping private sector firms in developing countries to work 
with their governments to bring cases to the WTO (Horlick in Mavroidis et al, 1998). 
Enhancing the Capacity within countries to deal with disputes domestically, whether 
through national (or even regional) judicial mechanisms or private arbitration, might also 
reduce the flow of cases to the WTO, Several donor countries have begun to provide trade- 
related technical assistance, some of which addresses OS, but there has been criticism of 
the amounts and effectiveness of the training on offer, particularly where it is managed 
bilaterally rather than through the WTO (Rajapathirana et al 2000). 
The OS mechanism may be in danger of overload 
without additional resources being made avai- 
lable at many levels. 
3D 
In fact, Brazil has suggested that the 
timelines be changed from calendar 
days to working days to provide some 
breathing space (Brazil 1 998) 
The WTO's regular budget for EA s 
CHF 0.14mn and the Director-General 
has called for this to be raised to CHE 
10 mn by 2003 In the meantime, the 
WTO has a trust fund for extra-budg- 
etary Contributions for TA. 
This position was supported by 
Canada inter alia, despite opposition 
from the US. It could mean that any 
country will now be in a position to 
take on the USTR -- using US lawyers 
if necessary (provided they can afford 
them). 
Kirsten Goodwin, Thomas & Davis, 
informal communicetion, Ottawa, 
March 25, 1999 
Capacity issues must also be considered ¡n the discussion about opening up the DS 
process to non-state actors (whether NGO or private sector). In the interests of 
transparency, some have argued for the right to make submissions and even appear 
independently before panels. Others are concerned that this would accelerate still further 
the 'laissez-litigez' nature of the WTO DS (Ostry 1999:11, 17). It would also likely increase 
the costs to the WTO, the workload of the WTO panelists, and even extend the timetable of 
the panels (Canada 1999a:4). Without additional resources to cover training and other 
costs, southern groups would be unable to participate in a more open WTO, which would 
merely exacerbate its existing 'structural asymmetry' (Ostry 1999:12). 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DSB'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND RETALIATORY MEASURES 
While many panel and AB reports have been adopted on schedule, their findings have not 
been implemented as expeditiously as intended, and in some cases the delays in compliance 
have damaged trade irreversibly. As the Brazilian ambassador to the US has said: "...What 
should be tightened,... is the time frame for the implementation of recommendations and 
rulings, as well as surveillance of implementation.... Compared to the strictness of panel 
procedures, implementation stands out as the weak link in the mechanism." 
Different parts of the WTO limit the scope for reversing trade restrictions. This is particularly 
the case with trade remedies; as noted by a Brazilian official, with respect to anti-dumping, 
"Article 2 of the Agreement allows ample margin for investigators to 'construct' the prices 
of the exporter under investigation. It is then often just a matter of torturing the numbers 
until they confess. Coupled with the standard of review laid down in Article 17:6 of the 
Agreement, it provides for a situation in which anti-dumping has been left basically at the 
discretion of the investigating authorities, with virtually no possibility for reinstatement 
under the DSU.....(Brazil 1998). 
One problem is that neither the panel nor the AB is required to rule on remedial action nor 
a reasonable time for compliance, although they can make sugges-tions.23 In some cases, 
arbitration has been used to determine that a reasonable time ranges from eight months to 
15 months or so (Zuijdwijk 1999:2-3). There are also no clear procedures for a 
complainant's disagreement with a defendant's approach in complying with a panel's 
ruling. In a few instances, the offending policy has not been withdrawn, leaving 
complainants with retaliation as the only option. This in turn has raised questions about the 
appropriateness of proposed retaliatory measures, and whether they really provide a 
solution for smaller, undiversified economies. 
In the bananas and culture 
cases, remedial action was 
taken which addressed the 
immediate concerns of the 
panel but at the same time new measures were introduced which did not improve the trade 
prospects for the complaining countries. It is unclear from Article 21.5 how such new 
measures should be reviewed, for instance whether by a new panel and then a new appeal, 
giving rise to the prospect of a never-ending dispute settlement process. Also unclear is the 
sequence for retaliation, i.e. whether a complaining country could request suspension of 
rights before a ruling is made on the consistency of the new measure (Herman cited in 
Canada 1999:3-1). 
Finding appropriate measures for retaliation has been difficult for big countries like the US 
as well as for smaller countries like Ecuador, and in neither case does it appear that the 
initial damage has been offset. 
In the banana case, the US has proposed to rotate punitive tariffs on EU products every six 
months under so-called 'carousel' legislation. The aim is to increase uncertainty for EU 
suppliers and thus the economic and political costs borne by the EU for its failure to comply 
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Different parts of the WTO limit the scope for 
reversing trade restrictions. 
23. 
Hoekman and Mavroidis (19991 note 
..a has become evident that the DSU 
has a potentially serious weakness in 
dealing with cases where It is alleged 
that the losing party has not imple. 
mented the panels recommendation. 
Such cases can easily arise when 
panels limit themselves to standard 
recommendations to bring measures 
into compliance, or, alternatively, if a 
panel's suggestions are not interpre- 
ted as binding." 
24. 
In the words of one critic. 'unless 
actions are taken to limit the role of 
panels in reducing the rights of coun- 
tries and increasing their obligations. 
it will strengthen social movements in 
the developing countries against the 
process of globalization and expan- 
sion of corporate rights. Third World 
Economics. 16 - 31 May 2000, No. 
233 p. 2. 
with the banana ruling. For Ecuador, however, its own economy was more likely to bear the 
brunt of high tariffs on EU products. It therefore sought a mixture of cross-retaliation (and was 
the first country to do so - in this case it sought non-enforcement of some EU IPRs) and cross- 
compensation outside the trade arena (i.e. additional financial assistance or even debt relief). 
These examples illustrate the inability of the DS mechanism to restore a country's rights, if 
another country refuses to comply with OS rulings. While financial compensation may help to 
offset damages, the multilateralization of sanctions may be a more effective way of ensuring 
the offending policy is changed (Rodrik 1995; Bhagirath LaI Das in Raghavan 2000). 
AUTHORITY 
Several questions have been raised about the authority of the panels and the AB. Many 
panels have resulted in substantive interpretations of WTO agreements, which involve an 
expansion of WTO members' rights and/or obligations.24 This is a departure from the 
traditional approach to rule-making, i.e. through multilateral negotiation. 
Even if the countries involved can be satisfied, there is a question about how the interests 
of countries not involved in a dispute would be taken into account. One suggestion is that 
other countries be allowed to make submissions to the AB even if they had riot previously 
registered a 'third-party' 
interest, though this might Many panels have resulted in substantive 
need to be limited to a interpretations of WTO agreements, which 
certain length to control the 
AB's workload (Canada involve an expansion of WTO members' rights 
1999:4). Another is that the and/or obligations. 
results from a panel or AB 
should only apply in that case; more radically, where changes in rights and obligations are 
at stake, the matter should be brought to the General Council, for approval by official 
representatives of all member countries (Bhagirath [al Das in Raghavan 2000). 
Others have argued that the decisions of the panels and AB might be more acceptable if 
their deliberations were more transparent, i.e. if the processes were open to the public, and 
even if the public were able to participate, e.g. through submissions. As mentioned earlier, 
however, this raises the issue of capacity - both the capacity of panels and ABs to cope with 
additional inputs, and the capacity of non-governmental groups in developing countries to 
participate in the same way that Northern NGOs and private companies would do. 
Finally, there remains some doubt as to the US' commitment to the authority of the WTO's 
DS bodies. This stems from the continued existence of Section 301 legislation, and the 
administration's listing of countries under Section 301, even where they have not broken 
any WTO rules. 
In sum, the evolution of the WTO's DS mechanism may have an impact on the upcoming 
negotiations in various ways. Not only will there be pressure to review some of the points raised 
above, but also worries about the DSB's capacity constraints may deter others from introducing 
new and complicated issues such as labour standards into the 'INTO agenda. At the same time, 
recognition of the overly legalistic approach of the WTO OS may deter these issues from being 
brought to the WTO, on the grounds that the 'INTO DS would be unable to address the more 
subtle and complex social policy issues involved (Ostry cited in Canada 1999). 
B. EVALUATION OF THE NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 
In general the NAFTA mechanisms appear to have been effective in resolving many 
disputes between the three countries. About a third of cases have been terminated before 
a decision was issued. In several anti-dumping cases, the panels have led to the reduction 
of duties. To date, none of the panels' binding decisions has been appealed to the 
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extraordinary challenge process; whereas there were three such challenges under the 
Canada-US FIA. But where decisions have been remanded to national authorities, this has 
caused delays. Delays have also resulted from the withdrawal of panellists, as well as 
lateness of depositions, motions and the filing of briefs and oral arguments. On average, 
though, the NAFTA mechanisms has produced findings more quickly than the national 
judicial review mechanisms. 
There have been various criticisms of the NAFTA dispute machinery. 
ln terms of technical capacity to bring a case, it has not been an issue in the same way 
as in the WTO, reflecting the more advanced state of trade law in the three member 
countries. Financial capacity can be a constraint, however, to the extent that the initial 
complainant (i.e. the firm which makes the request to the government to bring the case) 
often has counsel present throughout the case and has to pay for its own legal costs 
(US$200,000 to $600,000, according to some estimates cited in Howse, 1998:7). 
There is some concern about the capacity of the panelists to fully analyze the facts of a 
case, from experts in trade law or economics, to judges or retired judges. 
The Chapter 19 process has not been able to overturn inappropriately applied ADD or 
CVD. Rather, ifa panel finds the national law of the defendant country has been misapplied, 
it can only remand the case to the domestic agency to be reconsidered; it cannot order the 
duty removed (or lowered). 
The complainant may bring The Chapter 19 process has not been able to 
the case back (more than overturn inappropriately applied ADD or CVD. 
once) for further review if it 
is unhappy with the redetermination and this means the time-limit of 315 days may be 
exceeded. It is even possible that repeated remands can make a case last longer than if 
the complainant had used the US domestic challenge process i.e. the Court of International 
Trade (CIT), which is put at 734 days on average (Howse 1998:7) 
Some products have been the subject of several cases-- new complaints may be submitted 
leading to new investigations. Howse recommends that for such cases, it might be best for 
smaller countries to take a dispute to the \NTO. 
Another factor that may delay a case being settled is the broader scope for the extraordinary 
challenge committee, to examine both the factual and the legal analysis underlying a 
decision, which has led to an extension of the ECC process from 30 days under CUSFTA 
to 90 days under NAFTA. 
The limited authority of the binational panels, in that they can only review ADD/CVD within 
national laws where the standards of review are different, has led to an issue of asymmetry. 
Americans and Canadians do not have an equal opportunity to have findings reversed. 
Canadian law requires much greater errors for an agency's decision to be overturned with 
the result that Canadian complaints are more likely to be supported by a panel than is the 
case for the US. And the large share of rulings in Canada's favour has been heavily 
criticized by various groups in the US. 
The ad hoc nature of panels means that their findings may be inconsistent. One option 
to increase coherence is to create a standing body, with the resources available for 
technical support. Another idea is to broaden the membership of the panels to avoid 
suggestions of national bias. 
The issue of transparency and accountability of the NAFTA DS framework has been raised 
in Canada, partly in response to recent cases involving investor-state disputes that were 
candidates for arbitration under Chapter 11. In one involving a fuel additive, the Canadian 
government paid C$2Omn. in compensation to a US company in return for it dropping its 
NAFTA challenge.25 The fact that this was settled behind closed doors, as required under 
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25. 
Countries n the light of the opportu. 
nities that the new commitments 
open up for the design of Innovative 
export promotion policies. 
26. 
See Weston (1 996). In the case of 
lumber, however, Canada has recently 
decided to take the issue, which had 
led to its longstanding dispute with 
the US forest industry, for resolution 
by the WTO, 
the NAFTA, was widely criticized by the mainstream financial press as well as traditional 
NAFTA opponents. Similar concerns have been raised in the US and Canada, even when 
cases were taken to NAFTA tribunals. 
Another issue is the frequency with which these cases have challenged national 
environmental legislation, and in ways that are not available to national companies, rather 
than expropriation of assets as originally anticipated. In response, the Canadian 
government has urged the US and Mexico to review the scope of Chapter 11, both to make 
it more public and to limit the scope of challenges. 
Finally, it is important to note that there have been a number of disagreements, in particular 
between Canada and the US, that have not been addressed within the NAFTA DS 
framework, nor in the WTO. The governments and industries involved have chosen instead, 
in the case of politically sensitive issues (such as lumber, wheat and autos), to address 
these separately e.g. through bilateral agreements outside the NAFTA or a blue ribbon 
panel.26 In some cases, e.g. wheat, bilateral discussions were agreed by the US following 
Canadian requests for WTO and NAFTA consultations (Canada 1999:24). 
C. EVALUATION OF MERCOSUR DISPUTE SEULEMENT MECHANISMS 
There is clearly a need to amend the MERCOSUR DS system because: 
The number of consultations that were not concluded satisfactorily has been rising from 
year to year (with the exception of 1999, though in that year the share of cases pending 
resolution rose to 92% of cases brought for consultation). 
The share of cases pending resolution has also grown from year to year. 
Only a very few cases were taken beyond the consultations stage to become claims (seven 
out of a total of 354). 
'The MERCOSUR Trade Commission does not consider consultations in plenary anymore, 
rather the Commission limits itself to receiving them and automatically passes them to a 
Technical Committee for consideration. 
'The Technical Committee (formed by government officials) is almost never able to reach 
a joint opinion. 
The private sector is too excluded from the system. Their role is limited to presenting the 
claim, after which they can only lobby government officials. 
While there have been only three arbitral tribunals, two kind of problems have already 
emerged. First, because tribunals are ad hoc, there are divergent interpretations of the 
MERCOSUR norms. Second, the system does not allow for any kind of appellate action 
against the tribunal's findings (except for minor clarifications i.e. substantial aspects of the 
ruling cannot be reviewed). 
It is remarkable that there 
There is clearly a need to amend the MERCO- 
was so little use of the 
claims process, despite the SUR DS system. 
large number of consulta- 
tions that were not satisfactorily resolved. Also that only three arbitral tribunals were 
established, given that these are the only body able to dictate binding rulings. 
It is clear that during the 1995-2000 period, governments have preferred to use diplomatic 
means and even presidential intervention -- combined with a strategy of leaving 
consultations pending. 
Among the options that countries could consider to strengthen the system - and making it 
more efficient -- are: the creation of an arbitral tribunal on a permanent basis and to give 
the private sector an opportunity to formally participate in the consultation stage. 
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EVALUATION OF THE AC DISPUTE SEULEMENT SYSTEM 
In evaluating the role of the Court until 1995, some authors have stressed its under- 
utilization, arguing that it had been more of a presence than a real actor. This may have 
been due to an unspoken and unwritten commitment not to use the system, rather than 
because countries were complying with their regional commitments, as various facts 
suggest non-compliance was high (Aninat del Solar, 1992). 
Others have remarked that the 1980s were a lost decade for economic integration in Latin 
America and especially in the Andean Pact -- deadlines to achieve a free trade area and 
customs union were not met, many exceptions were negotiated, and business people lost 
faith in the process. Confronted with a high rate of non-compliance, Andean Pact members 
agreed not to bring charges against each other (Cárdenas, 1994). 
Judge Hurtado Larrea has noted the importance of economic crises in understanding the 
high rate of non-compliance cases. Until 1983, there were at least 92 cases. A moratorium 
was then declared for three months, and members involved in non-compliance cases were 
either to resolve the matter or submit the case to the Court. Even so, no member 
subsequently presented a non-compliance case until 1996. 
With the new energy that has been injected into the integration process, as well as the 
recent reforms in the dispute settlement system, it is possible to see an increase in its use. 
However, it is too early to comment on it. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Experience, particularly with the WTO, underlines the importance of building national (or in 
the case of smaller countries this might be sub-regional) capacity to deal with trade 
disputes. The hemispheric integration process should ensure that resources are made 
available for this capacity-building. 
In the first instance, there are a variety of domestic avenues that could be developed or 
strengthened for resolving trade disputes. One is through the use of alternative dispute 
resolution methods - i.e. outside national courts, let alone regional or even multilateral DS 
mechanisms. Another is the range of judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms (for instance, in 
Canada, disputes over Canada's compliance with its public procurement obligations can be 
taken to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal). 
A second area concerns the creation of advisory centres on international trade law - 
whether at the national, sub-regional or even regional level. These could be used to advise 
both private sector (and NGO) interests and governments about trade disputes and the best 
way of seeking redress, i.e. 
whether to seek remedial Experience, particularly with the WTO, under- 
action nationally, regionally, lines the importance of building national (or in 
hemispherically or through 
the WTO, and if so on what the case of smaller countries this might be sub- 
basis. There may also be a regional) capacity to deal with trade disputes. 
need for such centres to 
provide poorer, smaller countries in the hemisphere with the legal expertise needed to bring 
or defend cases. They could also be used to train judges, panellists and others involved in 
the adjudication of disputes. 
The final design of the hemispheric dispute settlement system will depend upon the results 
of the FTAA negotiations, i.e. the scope and nature of trade commitments among its 
members. There is much to be said for adopting a system closer to the WTO model than 
those used in the regional agreements - i.e. one that is not supranational, and neither too 
rigid nor too flexible, but with a process of consultations, panels and an appellate body. Of 
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course, there are a number of improvements on the WTO process that could be adopted, 
in terms of transparency and greater clarity with respect to the process for compliance. 
Finally, another issue to consider is that of subsidiarity - i.e. whether it makes sense to 
encourage, if not require, all intra-regional disputes to be taken to regional dispute 
settlement bodies, and hemispheric disputes to the FTAA DS body. This would reduce the 
burden of the WTO DSB. An alternative would be to introduce clearer rules to limit forum- 
shopping, for instance, to determine under what circumstances an intra-regional dispute 
could be taken to the regional, FTAA or WTO, and whether the WTO DSB could act as a 
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